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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following:
1.

Jack and Jill have been married for ten years. During the past five

years, they have been trying to have a baby. Unfortunately, Jack has
been unable to produce sperm, even with years of infertility treatment.
They still, however, desperately want to have a baby genetically related
to Jill.

2. Samson and Delilah have been married for ten years. For the past
five years, they have been trying to have a baby. Unfortunately,
Delilah's ovaries are incapable of producing healthy ova. After years
of taking fertility drugs, Delilah is still unable to conceive. They
desperately want a child genetically related to Samson.
3. Romeo and Juliet have been married for ten years. Ever since the
deaths of their feuding parents five years ago, they have been trying to
have a baby. Unfortunately, Juliet cannot carry the fetus to term even
if she is kept at bed rest. After many miscarriages and much heartache,
Romeo and Juliet accept the fact that Juliet will never be able to give
birth to a Capulet-Montague. They still, however, desperately seek a
genetic heir to their vast fortune.
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These three couples have a common problem. They all seek to have
a child; however, they are unable to do so through natural means.
Consequently, each couple will attempt to enter into a contract which
will allow them to experience the joy of the miracle of life. Jack and
Jill's solution is the simplest: all they must do is obtain sperm through
donation or purchase.' For the latter two couples, their solution is a bit
more complex: Samson and Delilah and Romeo and Juliet may attempt
to enter into the "infamous" commercial surrogacy contract, 2 medical
science's attempt to create a human life for an infertile married couple
with as many as six willing participants.4
Arguably, when entering into such a contract, these couples may
assert that they have a fundamental right to procreate.' The question
remains, however, whether this right extends to reproductive technologies
and, in particular, the ability to contract with a third party in order to
reproduce a genetic offspring. Unfortunately for these couples, current

1. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996) (permitting reasonable
compensation to be paid for sperm, ova, or embryo donation).
2. Cf. Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that although the
right to privacy and the right to procreative freedom allow a childless couple to contract with a
surrogate, these constitutional rights do not include the right to compensate a surrogate).
3. "Infertility" is defined as the "inability to conceive after twelve months of intercourse
without contraception." Anne Goodwin, DeterminationofLegal Parentagein EggDonation,Embryo
Transplantation,and GestationalSurrogacyArrangements, 26 FAM. L.Q. 275, 275 (1992); see also
OFFICE OF TECH. AsSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES 3
(1988) [hereinafter INFERTILITY].
4. In the most complicated scenario, six people are involved: the egg donor, the sperm donor,
the gestational host or surrogate and her husband, and the couple who intend to raise the baby. But
see Goodwin, supranote 3, at 276 (stating that as many as five persons may participate in noncoital
procreation: the egg donor, the sperm donor, the gestational surrogate, and the two non-genetic
persons who intend to raise the child); John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a "Parent"?
The Claims ofBiology as the Basisfor ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 354 (1991) (same).
The surrogate's husband must be included in the contract if the state paternity statutes or state
evidence codes give him parental rights. See Hill, supra, at 372-73 (discussing the common law
presumption of legitimacy and designation of the birth mother's husband as the legal father of the
child); Keith J. Cunningham, Comment, Surrogate Mother Contracts: Analysis of a Remedial
Quagmire, 37 EMORY L.J. 721, 734-36 (1988) (discussing civil laws governing proof of paternity
and their effect on surrogacy arrangements).
5. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."). In fact, with respect
to the use of contraception, the Supreme Court has found that the right to procreate applies not only
to those who are married, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965), but also to
those who are not married, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.").
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public policy considerations may render these commercial surrogacy
contracts unenforceable simply as a result of their subject matter.'
Because of the vastness of this controversial topic, this Note
considers only the contractual issues involved in commercial surrogacy
contracts, with emphasis on gestational surrogacy agreements Part II
argues that there exists no legitimate public policy reason for denying the
enforcement of commercial surrogacy contracts of a gestational nature.
This section first discusses the difference between traditional and
gestational surrogacy contracts and then details the legal status of
commercial surrogacy contracts on both a national and international level.
Further, it describes the public policy arguments against commercial
surrogacy arrangements and reveals their inappropriate application to
gestational surrogacy. Lastly, it examines the nature of the commercial
gestational surrogacy contract as a contract for a service. Part III
investigates the enforceability of the commercial gestational surrogacy
contract and considers the application of contract law to solve problems
which may arise after the agreement. This Note concludes that the
unenforceability of commercial surrogacy contracts is an inappropriate
solution: it is problematic not only for the parties to the contract but also
for the courts.
IH.

COMMERCIAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS:
TRADITIONAL VERSUS GESTATIONAL

In many jurisdictions within the United States and foreign nations,
the enforceability of commercial surrogacy contracts is questionable.
Their unenforcement is predicated upon public policy considerations.
However, these purported grounds for their unenforceability should not
be so all encompassing. Instead, gestational surrogacy contracts must be
distinguished from traditional surrogacy arrangements. Consequently, this
distinction calls for the legality and the enforcement of gestational
surrogacy contracts.

6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 181 (1981) (noting that public policy
considerations may make a contract unenforceable).
7. Detailed discussions of family law issues are outside the scope of this Note.
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A.

Types of Surrogacy Contracts

A surrogate is defined as the "gestational carrier of any embryo, a
fetus, or a child."8 In other words, she is an incubator in which a baby
can grow. Her relation to the child depends upon the type of surrogacy
arrangement and the reproductive problem which the married couple
encounters.
1. Traditional Surrogacy
Recall the unfortunate situation of Samson and Delilah.9 The
solution to their problem (i.e., Delilah's inability to produce healthy ova)
is the traditional surrogacy contract,'0 an arrangement whereby
Samson's sperm is used to fertilize a surrogate's ovum which the
surrogate will then carry to term." In this situation, the baby is geneti8. American Bar Ass'n, Model Surrogacy Act, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 270,271 (Larry
Gostin ed., 1990).
9. See supra p. 1222.
10. The term "traditional" is used to indicate the original form of surrogacy arrangements.
Gestational surrogacy did not come into use in the United States until 1985. See INFERTILITY, supra
note 3, at 36.
11. This procedure is called artificial insemination. It involves the injection of sperm into the
surrogate's birth canal by noncoital means. See ic at 126-28.
However, Samson and Delilah do have two alternative solutions. First, they may obtain
healthy ova through donation. This procedure is called gamete donation, or oocyte, or ovum
donation. It involves the donation of one woman's genetic material to another woman who is lacking
healthy or viable ova. See generally Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical
Considerationsof Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 62 FERTILrIY AND STERILrrY IS,35S-77S
(Supp. 1 1994) (discussing assisted reproductive technologies and procedures available to solve
infertility). Although this process is generally referred to as a "donation," see Malina Coleman,
Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhoodin the Era ofAssisted Human Reproduction,
17 CARDozo L. REv. 497, 502 n.29 (1996), women who donate ova may be paid on average $2000
per donation, see Goodwin, supra note 3, at 276; Gina Kolata, Young Women Offer to Sell Their
Eggs to Infertile Couples, N.Y. TrMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at Al.
The healthy ova are fertilized outside the womb with Samson's sperm, and the resulting
preembryos are then implanted within Delilah in hopes that she carries the fetus to term. This
procedure is called in vitro fertilization. See infra note 13 and accompanying text. In this
arrangement, Samson is the genetic and legal father of the child. Although Delilah is not genetically
related to the baby, she is considered both the birth mother and the legal mother of the child due to
the common law presumption that the birth mother is the legal mother. See INFERTILITY, supra note
3, at 282; cf Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding Arizona's
surrogacy statute violative of the equal protection clause because it failed to allow a biological
mother who had donated ova to prove maternity).
Samson and Delilah's second option is to again obtain healthy ova through gamete donation,
but instead of implanting the preembryos within Delilah, they may opt to utilize a gestational
surrogate. See infra Part II.A.2. In this variation, however, neither the birth mother (the surrogate)
nor the intended mother (Delilah) are genetically linked to the baby.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1221

cally linked to Samson and the surrogate; Delilah has no genetic ties or
parental rights to the baby. Instead, in order for Delilah to become the
legal mother, the parties will specify in the contract that, in return for
compensation, the surrogate must relinquish all parental rights to the
12
baby so that Delilah can adopt him or her.
2. Gestational Surrogacy
Unlike Samson and Delilah, Romeo and Juliet seek to enter into a
gestational surrogacy arrangement whereby Juliet's healthy ova are
fertilized outside the womb with Romeo's sperm and the resulting
preembryos are implanted within the uterus of a surrogate. 3 In this
situation, the resulting baby is genetically linked to Romeo and Juliet; 4
the surrogate has no genetic ties to the baby but, instead, simply serves
as an incubator. Although the surrogate obviously becomes the birth
mother, the contracting parties specify as a term in their contract that
Romeo and Juliet become the legal parents of the baby upon his or her
birth and, in return for her services, the surrogate is to receive compensation. 5
B.

History & Legal Status of Surrogacy Contracts

Reproductive technologies date back to the eighteenth century. 6
However, the first child born in the United States of gestational
surrogacy did not occur until 1985Y' Before then, one woman served as
both the genetic mother and gestational mother of the child. Thus, this
8
scientific breakthrough separates the various stages of reproduction,

12. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241-42 (NJ. 1988).
13. This procedure is called in vitro fertilization. It involves the removal of ova from one

woman, and after fertilization of the ova in a laboratory culture, the transference of several
preembryos to a woman's uterus for gestation. See INFERTILITY, supra note 3, at 123; John Dwight

Ingram, In Vitro Fertilization:Problems and Solutions, 98 DIcK. L. REv. 67, 67-69 (1993). In
common parlance, the resulting fetus is called a test-tube baby.

14. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Ct. App. 1994) (noting that
gestational surrogacy creates a baby who is genetically related to both members of the married
couple).

15. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (en bane).
16. The first reported use of artificial insemination of a woman by her husband's sperm

occurred in 1799. See INFERTLITY, supra note 3, at 36. The first reported use of artificial
insemination by a donor occurred in 1866; however, the procedure was not often used until the
twentieth century. See CARMEL SHALEV, BiRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 59 (1989).
17. See INFERTILITY, supra note 3, at 36.

18. The stages of procreation are coitus, conception, and gestation. See Hill, supra note 4, at

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss4/4
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causing havoc with respect to legal parenthood.' 9 As a result, even
though procreation can no longer be regulated,2" many state courts and
state legislatures either refuse to enforce, highly regulate, or criminalize

traditional and gestational surrogacy contracts for public policy reasons,
especially where compensation is involved. Since Congress has yet to

enact federal legislation relating to such contracts,2' the issue has not
been resolved consistently by the state courts and state legislatures. As
a result, certain states may become havens for infertile couples seeking

children through traditional or gestational surrogacy. Uniform regulation
is needed so that infertile couples in every state are offered the same
opportunity to produce a genetic offspring through surrogacy arrangements.
1. Judicial Responses to Surrogacy Contracts
At first glance, the case law on surrogacy contracts is not consistent.

The reason for this inconsistency lies in the factual differences involved
in each case. Considering the judicial response in light of these factual

differences helps to clarify the case law. In particular, one must keep in
mind the type of commercial surrogacy contract at issue in order to

distinguish the seemingly conflicting law. In short, courts generally look
down upon traditional surrogacy contracts; 22 however, they tend to be

19. There exist differing approaches to the problem of legal parentage, including tests based
on intent, genetic contribution, gestation, and the best interests of the child. See Johnson, 851 P.2d
at 782-83 (applying an "intent test"); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1255-64 (N.J. 1988) (applying
a "best interests of the child test"); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763-64 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994)
(applying a "genetic test"); see also Coleman, supra note 11, at 505-25 (discussing the intent,
genetics, and gestation tests used to determine legal parentage); Goodwin, supra note 3, at 281-89
(discussing genetics-based parenthood, intent-based parenthood, and gestational motherhood);
Victoria L. Fergus, Note, An Interpretation of Ohio Law on Maternal Status in Gestational
Surrogacy Disputes: Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio C.P. Summit County 1994), 21 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 229, 237-48 (1995) (discussing the birth, genetics, best interests, and intent tests);
Michelle Pierce-Gealy, Comment, "Are You My Mother?": Ohio's Crazy-Making Baby-Making
Produces a New Definition of "Mother," 28 AKRON L. REV. 535, 550-61 (1995) (discussing and
critiquing the simple genetics, the genetics plus intent, and the best interests standards); Stephanie
F. Schultz, Note, Surrogacy Arrangements: Who are the "Parents" of a Child Born Through
Artificial Reproductive Techniques?, 22 Otno N.U. L. REv. 273, 282-88 (1995) (discussing legal
parentage based on the intention doctrine, biology and genetics, and the gestational host).
20. See supra note 5.
21. With surrogacy as an interstate business, Congress has the power to enact regulatory
legislation under the Commerce Clause. See INFERTLY, supra note 3, at 26. In fact, there exist two
failed attempts by Congress to pass federal legislation that would prohibit or restrict surrogacy
arrangements. See Anti-Surrogate-Mother Act of 1989, H.R. 576, 101st Cong.; Surrogacy
Arrangements Act of 1989, H.R. 275, 101st Cong.
22. See infira Parts II.B.l.a.
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a bit more tolerant of gestational surrogacy contracts.2
a. Judicial Response to Traditional Surrogacy Contracts
The enforceability of a commercial surrogacy contract was
addressed for the first time in the celebrated case In re Baby M.24 The
case involved a traditional surrogacy contract between William Stem and
Mary Beth Whitehead' whereby Mrs. Whitehead agreed to bear a child
for the Stems and terminate her parental rights in exchange for $10,000
and payment of all fees and expenses incurred as a result of the
pregnancy.26 After agreeing to this arrangement, Mrs. Whitehead was
artificially inseminated with Mr. Stem's sperm." The problem arose
before the birth of the child when Mrs. Whitehead decided that she
28
wanted to retain custody of the baby.
The New Jersey Supreme Court declared all surrogacy contracts
void and unenforceable as violative of several state laws and public
policies.29 In particular, the contract's unenforceability was predicated
upon the following laws: those which prohibit the exchange of money in
connection with adoptions;3" those which require "proof of parental
unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered
or an adoption is granted"; 3' and those which permit a woman to revoke
her surrender of custody and consent to adoption in private placement
adoptions.32 Thus, the court compared the practice of commercial
surrogacy to baby-selling, arguing that state laws prohibiting the sale of

23. For example, courts in California enforce gestational surrogacy contracts, see Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc), but they hold unenforceable traditional surrogacy
contracts, see In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994); see also infra Part
II.B.I.b.
24. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
25. Mrs. Stem was not a party to the contract. Instead, the contract only referred to her as
William Stem's infertile wife. See id. at 1265, In addition, the contract stipulated that in the event
of Mr. Stem's death, whether prior or subsequent to the child's birth, Mrs. Stem was to receive
custody. See id. at 1267.
26. See id. at 1235. The Stems' situation is similar to that of Samson and Delilah, discussed
supra p. 1222.
27. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1267. Consequently, Mrs. Whitehead was both the genetic and
gestational mother.
28. See id. at 1236.
29. See id. at 1240-50.
30. See id. at 1240.
31. Id.
32. See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss4/4
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babies also applied to surrogacy contracts for public policy reasons.33
After finding surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable in New Jersey,
the court was left to decide the custody issue.34

b. Judicial Response to Gestational Surrogacy Contracts
Five years after Baby M, the enforceability of a commercial
surrogacy contract was again tested in Johnson v. Calvert.35 Unlike
Baby M,36 Johnson involved a gestational surrogacy contract between
the Calverts37 and Mrs. Johnson whereby she agreed to gestate the
Calverts' child and relinquish all parental rights to the Calverts who
would raise the baby.38 As consideration, the Calverts agreed to pay
Mrs. Johnson $10,000 in cash and a $200,000 life insurance policy on
her life.39
Four days after signing the contract, the zygote which had formed
through in vitro fertilization was implanted in Mrs. Johnson's uterine
cavity.' As the pregnancy proceeded, relations between the parties
deteriorated when the Calverts learned of Mrs. Johnson's previous

33. The court stated:
This is the sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a mother's right to her
child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the purchasers is the father. Almost
every evil that prompted the prohibition on the payment of money in connection with
adoptions exists here.
Id. at 1248. But see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (arguing that
surrogacy can be distinguished from adoption; thus, the prohibition against the exchange of money
does not apply). For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part II.C.
34. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1255-61; see also In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
893, 894-95 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding a traditional surrogacy contract unenforceable); Surrogate
Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Ky. 1986)
(holding surrogacy contracts voidable rather than illegal and void); Doe v. Kelley, 307 NAV.2d 438,
441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the surrogacy contract was void because it would violate
a statute banning the exchange of money in connection with an adoption); In re Adoption of Baby
Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 (Sur. Ct. 1986) (holding a surrogacy contract voidable rather than
void because its terms violated state adoption statutes).
35. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
36. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text and discussion infra Part II.C.
37. Unlike the agreement in Baby M, see supra note 25, both Mark and Crispina Calvert
entered into the agreement with Anna Johnson. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
38. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. The Calverts entered into the gestational surrogacy
agreement because Crispina Calvert was forced to undergo a hysterectomy and was therefore unable
to gestate a fetus. See id. The Calverts' situation resembles that of Romeo and Juliet discussed supra
p. 1222.
39. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. The Calverts were to pay $10,000 to Mrs. Johnson in a
series of installments and the premiums on the $200,000 life insurance policy. See Eat
40. See id. For a discussion of the procedure, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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miscarriages and stillbirths.4 Feeling abandoned during an onset of

premature labor and angered that the Calverts failed to obtain the life
insurance policy as they had promised, Mrs. Johnson demanded
immediate payment of the balance of the money due her or she would
keep the baby.4 2 As a result, both parties filed petitions seeking to be
declared the legal parents of the unborn child.43

The Calverts and Mrs. Johnson presented to the California Supreme
Court a case of first impression. After wrestling with the determination

of who was the natural mother of the child,' the court held that a
surrogate has no parental rights to a child who is not genetically linked
to her.45 The court arrived at this conclusion after rejecting the public

policy arguments advanced by Mrs. Johnson.' Instead, custody should
be awarded to the couple who supplied the zygote and intended to raise
the child as per the agreement.47
2. State Legislatures' Responses to Surrogacy Contracts
Similar to the court's holding in Johnson, a majority of people in
the United States believe that legal parentage should be based upon the
intentions of the parties to a surrogacy arrangement and that surrogacy
agreements should be legally enforceable.48 However, state legislatures
have not responded accordingly.49 In fact, only four states have enacted

41. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id at 779-83. For a discussion of this family law issue, see Teresa Abell, Comment,
GestationalSurrogacy:Intent-BasedParenthoodin Johnson v. Calvert, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1429,
1433-35 (1994).
45. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 777-78, 782. But see id. at 788-801 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority should have based its decision on the best interests of the child).
46. See id. at 785. The court also rejected the constitutional arguments raised by Mrs. Johnson.
See id. at 785-87.
47. See id.at 782. The court stated: .'.
W]hile all of the players in the procreative arrangement
are necessary in bringing a child into the world, the child would not have been born butfor the
efforts of the intended parents."'Id. (quoting Hill, supra note 4, at 415).
48. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 503 n.36; John Lawrence Hill, Exploitation, 79 CORNELL
L. REv. 631, 638 n.31 (1994).
49. At least twenty states have enacted legislation addressing surrogate contracts. See ALA.
CODE §§ 26-IOA-33 to -34 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (,Vest 1991); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-10-201 (Michie 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.13,742.15-.16 (,Vest 1986 & Supp. 1996); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-2-1 to-3 (West Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.590(2), .590(4), .990
(Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1991); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 722.851.863 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 126.045 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to -B:32 (1994 & Supp. 1996);
N.J STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-41, :17-44 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-124
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legislation providing for the legality and enforceability of surrogacy
agreements: Florida, 0 Nevada,5' New Hampshire,52 and Virginia."
Nevertheless, these four states prohibit couples from paying compensation to the surrogate for her services in excess of any expenses54
incurred as a result of the pregnancy.5 Furthermore, Florida, New
Hampshire, and Virginia are the only states which specifically address
gestational surrogacy contracts;56 the rest do not distinguish between the
two types of surrogacy arrangements. Instead, in at least seven states, all
surrogacy agreements are void and unenforceable." Five other states
and the District of Columbia impose civil and criminal penalties on those
who enter into such contracts. 8 This lack of legislative support for the

legalization of commercial surrogacy contracts may be attributed to
concerns about the possible exploitation of surrogates by the intended
(McKinney Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -07 (1991 & Supp. 1995); OR. REV.

STAT.

§§ 109.239, .243, .247 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(46)(A) (1996); UTAH CODE

ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.26.210-.260 (West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-16 (1996).
50. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.13, .15, .16.
51. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045.
52. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to -B:32.
53. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165.
54. In Nevada, the expenses are limited to medical and living expenses. See NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 126.045(3).
55. For a detailed discussion of legislation on surrogacy, see Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M:

InternationalPerspectives on Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary Biological
Mother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193, 209-13 (1996); Susan A. Ferguson, Comment, Surrogacy

Contracts in the 1990's: The Controversy and Debate Continues, 33 DuQ. L. REv. 903, 922-26
(1995).
56. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.15-.16 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 168-B:I to -B:32; VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165.
57. Surrogacy contracts are void in the following states: (1) Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §25-218(A) (,Vest 1991); (2) Indiana, see IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (,Vest Supp. 1996);
(3) Lousiana, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (West 1991); (4) Michigan, see MICH. COMP.

LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); (5) Nebraska, see NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 25-21,200(1) (Supp. 1996); (6) North Dakota, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (Michie 1991 &
Supp. 1995); and (7) Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-I-102(46)(A) (1996).
58. Surrogacy contracts are outlawed in the following jurisdictions: (1) District of Columbia,
see D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (Supp. 1996) (imposing a civil penalty, or one year imprisonment,
or both, for entering into, assisting, or inducing another to enter into a surrogacy contract); (2)
Kentucky, see KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.990 (Michie 1995) (class D felony); (3) Michigan, see

MICH. CoM. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.857(2), .859 (deeming it a felony to enter into surrogacy contracts
with a minor or a mentally infirm woman or to procure surrogacy agreements for compensation);
(4) New York, see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (imposing a civil penalty
upon those entering into a surrogacy agreement and a felony for third parties who recruit or procure
women to become surrogates); (5) Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(1)(d) (1995) (class B
misdemeanor); and (6) Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.250 (West Supp. 1997)

(gross misdemeanor).
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parents, by agents who bring the parties together for a profit, and by
society as a whole. 9

3. International Developments Regarding Surrogacy Contracts
Many European countries also outlaw commercial surrogacy.'
There is little consensus, however, between the countries on the

regulation of noncommercial surrogacy.6 Some countries prohibit the
use of donated ova or sperm or both.62 Other countries highly regulate

surrogacy and in vitro fertilization.63 Still other countries lack in vitro
fertilization and surrogacy regulation. Because of these inconsistencies,

couples living in one country where surrogacy is banned may seek a
contract in a foreign nation which permits such an agreement. Thus,
unless all countries make surrogacy criminal,'

the emergence of

international surrogacy contracts may give rise to certain countries
becoming havens for infertile couples seeking children through traditional
or gestational surrogacy agreements.

59. See Hill, supra note 48, at 637-44; see also infra Part II.C.2.
60. The following European countries ban commercial surrogacy: Britain, France, Germany,
Greece, Israel, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. See Krim, supranote 55, at 215 (citing Leo Uzych,
The Mother of All Questions: How to Govern Surrogacy, PA. L.J., Mar. 8, 1993, at 2).
61. For a detailed discussion of international legislation, see id. at 215-19.
62. For example, in Germany, it is unlawful to implant an ovum within a woman who did not
provide it. See id. at 215. Hence, it is impossible to enter into a legal gestational surrogacy contract.
In Sweden, the use of donated ova or sperm and the anonymous donation of sperm have been
banned. See id. at 215-16 (citing Improvised Guidelines on Motherhood's Brave New World,
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 5, 1994, at 9).
63. For example, Britain regulates in vitro fertilization and voluntary surrogacy through the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 which details the criteria for the usage of such
procedures and the legal status of the parents. See id. at 217-18 (citing Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37).
Similarly, in Israel, the first country to enact national legislation governing surrogacy
arrangements, the Parliament legalized noncommercial surrogacy arrangements. See id. at 219. It
currently requires approval of the surrogacy contract by a committee appointed by the Health
Minister. See id. (citing Judy Siegel, Health Ministry Tackles TB, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 7, 1996,
at 5) (giving approval of a'surrogacy contract if it is reached freely by both parties and if there exists
no danger to the mother's health or to the baby's health and rights). It also requires adherence to the
following strict regulations: (1) the sperm must be provided by the intended father; (2) the baby must
be conceived through in vitro fertilization; (3) the surrogate must be an unmarried, Israeli resident;
(4) the surrogate may be paid compensation for her suffering, her loss of time and income, and her
legal fees and insurance, but additional compensation is prohibited; and (5) the surrogate may change
her mind and keep the baby, subject only to court approval, or abort the fetus according to existing
abortion law. See id. (citing Judy Siegel, Surrogate Mother Bill Must Soon Be Law, JERUSALEM
PoT, Dec. 19, 1995, at 3).
64. A worldwide ban of surrogacy is highly unlikely, considering the current inconsistencies
between nations and within the United States.
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C. InappropriatePolicy Arguments Against GestationalSurrogacy
An obstacle to making consistent the law on surrogacy is the fact
that many state courts and legislatures (and even commentators) fail to
distinguish between the two types of surrogacy, traditional and gestational, and too quickly refer to both arrangements simply as "surrogacy." By
distinguishing between the two, it becomes clear that the public policy
arguments advanced by state courts and legislatures against traditional
surrogacy contracts do not apply to gestational surrogacy arrangements.
As a result, all surrogacy contracts should not be void and unenforceable
as declared by the Baby M court;65 instead, gestational surrogacy
arrangements, even if commercial, should remain enforceable.
1. Potential Devastating Effects
In Baby M, the court advanced many policy arguments in finding all
surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable, one of which was the
potential devastating long-term effects of surrogacy contracts upon all
those concerned:
The long-term effects of surrogacy contracts are not known, but
feared-the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that
she is the offspring of someone who gave birth to her only to obtain
money; the impact on the natural mother as the full weight of her
isolation is felt along with the full reality of the sale of her body and
her child; the impact on the natural father and adoptive mother once
they realize the consequences of their conduct."
However, in Johnson, the California Supreme Court was unpersuaded by
this argument. Because there existed no substantial evidence to support
this claim, the court declared that the "limited data available seem[s] to
reflect an absence of significant adverse effects of surrogacy on all
participants. 6 7
Without definitive evidence of harm to those involved in a
surrogacy arrangement, it appears too speculative to assume that
devastating effects will result. Further, even assuming arguendo that such
consequences will follow, they should not be examined in isolation.
Instead, courts should perform a balancing test so that they also consider

65. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240-50 (NJ. 1988); see also supra notes 29-34 and
accompanying text.
66. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1250.

67. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993) (en bane).
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the many positive attributes of the arrangement. 8 In addition to the
inquiry made by the Baby M court, courts should contemplate the
following beneficial effects of the gestational arrangement: the impact on
the child who learns that her genetic parents wanted her so much that
they went through many medical procedures and spent thousands of
dollars in order to bring her into the world, that she was not an accident
but, instead, the miracle child for which her parents prayed for years; the
impact on the birth mother who realizes that she gave to an infertile
couple the miracle of birth and the joy of family life; and the impact on
the genetic parents once they hold the child in their arms and acknowledge that she is theirs to raise and love.
2. Exploitation
The exploitation argument against commercial surrogacy contracts
takes many forms. 9 Some opponents contend that the contracts economically exploit women." Others argue that commercial surrogacy
contracts "commodify" women and children.7' Others equate surrogacy
to prostitution and thus conclude that the former should be banned.72
However, these opponents fail to acknowledge that the law recognizes a
woman's ability to contract and make decisions regarding the use of her
own body without government interference.73 They also fail to recognize
that the economic, social, and psychological motivations predisposing a
woman to enter into a surrogacy contract do not satisfy all the conditions
for exploitation.74

68. See Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflectiohs on the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1793, 1801-04

(1988); see also discussion infra Part III.A.2.b.
69. For a detailed discussion of exploitation, see Hill, supra note 48.
70. See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHtNE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTICIAL INSEMiNATION TO ARTiFICiAL WOMBS 213-229 (1985); Hill, supra note 48, at 638-39;
see also infra Part II.C.2.a.
71. See COREA, supra note 70, at 219; Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding
Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 127, 146-47 (1986); Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1930-33 (1987); see also infra Part II.C.2.b.
72. See COREA, supra note 70, at 227-28 (citing Andrea Dworkin, who equates sunogacy to
prostitution); see also infra Part II.C.2.c.
73. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the principle that
a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before fetal viability without government
interference).

74. See Hill, supra note 48, at 683-90; see also infra Part II.C.2.d.
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a. Economic Exploitation
A public policy argument advanced by the court in Baby M was that
commercial surrogacy, like baby-selling, potentially degrades and
financially exploits the natural mother.7' The monetary enticement takes
advantage of the surrogate's circumstances, especially her need for
money,76 and causes her decision to be involuntary:
[The surrogate] never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for
quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most
important sense, uninformed, and any decision after that, compelled by
a pre-existing contractual commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the
inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less than totally voluntary.1
Furthermore, since the arrangement involves a large payment, a class
distinction arises whereby the rich benefit at the expense of the poor.78
Acknowledging that women of a lower economic class would more
likely serve as surrogates than those of a higher economic class, the
Johnson court nevertheless was unpersuaded by this argument since there
existed no factual basis to support exploitation. 7' The court reasoned
that surrogacy contracts do not necessarily exploit poor women any more
than society in general exploits them:
Although common sense suggests that women of lesser means serve as
surrogate mothers more often than do wealthy women, there has been
no proof that surrogacy contracts exploit poor women to any greater
degree than economic necessity in general exploits them by inducing
them to accept lower-paid or otherwise undesirable employment."0
In fact, data compiled on surrogates shows that they are not economically
exploited."' Although women generally serve as surrogates for monetary

75. See In re Baby M, 537 A2d 1227, 1250 (NJ. 1988).
76. See id. at 1249.
77. Id. at 1248.
78. See id. at 1249. The court stated:
[I]t is clear to us that it is unlikely that surrogate mothers will be as proportionately
numerous among those women in the top twenty percent income bracket as among those
in the bottom twenty percent. Put differently, we doubt that infertile couples in the lowincome bracket will find upper income surrogates.
Id. (citation omitted).
79. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
80. Id.
81. See Hill, supra note 48, at 691-95 (noting that "there is little compelling evidence for the
claim that surrogate arrangements are inherently exploitative").
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reasons, there exist nonmonetary factors motivating them as well: many
assert an altruistic desire to provide an infertile couple a baby;82 some
would like to experience pregnancy without having to raise a child;"
and others are attracted to the arrangement after having worked in a
"nurturing field" such as medicine or childhood education. 4 Furthermore, surrogates tend to be drawn from the lower-middle and middle
classes "with annual incomes between $15,000 and $50,000 in 1987
dollars.""5 As a consequence, the economic exploitation argument fails.
b. Commodification
The second type of exploitation argument deals with
commodification. In particular, many feminist scholars argue that women
will be commodified as a result of their reproductive capacity.86 They
fear that women will be hired as surrogates as a result of their beauty,
intelligence, or race.87 They further argue that all surrogacy arrangements promote a system of purchase and sale of babies, and thus
commodify children.8
However, Professor Epstein rejects each of these arguments.89 First,
he concludes that women are not reduced to commodities unless they
themselves believe they have been commodified:
The claim about commodification therefore has nothing whatsoever to
do with what a woman may or may not do with her own body, or what
a man may or may not do with his own sperm. Instead it is an effort
by some to impose their own conception of the right and proper thing
to do with bodies, eggs and sperm on other individuals who hew to
different conceptions of the good. In order to restrain the behavior of
others, some greater warrant than a diffuse condemnation of their
conduct is needed ....No one's views on commodification should be
imposed on other individuals who do not share those views. The
women who want to enter into surrogacy contracts are not reduced to

82. See id. at 692 (citations omitted).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 691 (footnote omitted).
86. See id. at 639-44.
87. See id.at 639.
88. See Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A MaternalisticApproach to Surrogacy: Comment on
Richard Epstein'sSurrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2377,
2380-81 (1995).
89. See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Casefor Full ContractualEnforcement, 81 VA.
L. REv.2305, 2325-40 (1995).
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commodities solely because others mistakenly hold to that view."
Second, Professor Epstein determines that surrogacy arrangements
do not commodify children.9' He argues that unlike a good, a commodity is typically meant for consumption and does not have a unique
subjective value.' In other words, a commodity may be perfectly
substituted with another unit.93 Since a baby is unique and cannot be
perfectly substituted, the term "commodity" is inappropriate to describe
the relationship of a parent to a child.94 Thus, Professor Epstein
concludes that it is impossible for the arrangement to commodify a
child.9"
c.

Comparison to Prostitution

Next, feminist scholars argue that surrogacy contracts are a form of
prostitution or slavery whereby a woman exchanges the use of her body
for money.96 They argue that prostitutes (who are usually women) and
surrogates usually choose their roles as a result of economic necessity.97
Consequently, both are women who remain the victims of exploitation."
Since prostitution is illegal for moral reasons, they conclude that
surrogacy should also be prohibited."
This argument fails for two reasons. First, as Professor Epstein
notes, the enforcement of contracts cannot be blocked simply because
others disapprove of the motives and actions of the parties to the
agreement."' In other words, morality alone is not a sufficient reason
to criminalize these contracts; some other justification is needed. For
example, with respect to abortion, the Supreme Court has explicitly
stated that morality alone cannot be the basis for the law:

90. Id. at 2326.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
See id. at 2327.
See id.
See id. at 2326-38.
See id. at 2328.

96. See Katherine B. Lieber, Note, Selling the Womb: Can the FeministCritique ofSurrogacy

Be Answered?, 68 IND. LJ. 205, 211 (1992) (explaining that feminists view surrogacy as a form of
prostitution or slavery which exploits the surrogate through "the enticements of money, the social

expectation of self-sacrifice, or both").
97. See Hill, supra note 48, at 641-42.

98. See id. at 641.
99. See id. at 641-42.
100.

See Epstein, supra note 89, at 2341.
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Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we
suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and
spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest
stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most
basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code."'
Similarly, morality alone cannot control the law of surrogacy: the state
cannot impose its view of surrogacy as an immoral practice upon others
who do not share that same view. As a result, the contracts must be
upheld so long as the individual terms of the contract do not violate an
existing law (other than those specifically addressing surrogacy
arrangements) and there exists no problem in the bargaining process.
Second, surrogacy arrangements can be distinguished from
prostitution by simply examining the purpose behind each transaction to
determine whether the ends justify the means.' In other words, to
understand the difference between these two arrangements, one must
consider why these contracts are sought: why do men seek prostitutes,
and why do infertile couples seek surrogates? Admittedly, in both
situations, a woman is paid money for the use of her body. However,
surrogacy arrangements are sought to bring a wanted life into this world,
that of a child whom the infertile couple desperately seeks but has not
been able to produce on its own. There exist no base qualities in the
transaction. Prostitution, on the other hand, is a sordid arrangement. Its
sole objective is physical pleasure, and unlike gestational surrogacy
contracts, it has the potential of affecting society as a whole. Hence, this
comparison fails: how can one possibly compare the miracle of life to
vile pleasure?'
d. Non-Exploitative Arrangement
Even if the above arguments against surrogacy seem logical, they
all misinterpret the meaning of exploitation in its truest sense. According

101. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
102. See, e.g., NiCCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (George Bull trans., Penguin Books 1981).
103. A third possible argument against this morality-based comparison is the contradictory laws
in Nevada. Ironically, prostitution is legal in licensed houses of prostitution, see NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 201.354 (Michie 1997) (deeming it legal for a person to engage in prostitution or solicitation
if such acts occur in a licensed house of prostitution), yet surrogacy contracts, although enforceable,
are limited to compensating the surrogate for medical and living expenses, see NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 126.045(3) (Michie Supp. 1995).
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to Professor Hill, actual exploitation is a psychological, rather than a
social or economic, concept consisting of six elements:
The putatively exploitative proposal must: 1) consist of an offer of
benefit, never a threat; 2) which is made intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly on the part of the offeror, such that it is likely to involve,
implicate or take advantage of; 3) a psychologically recognized
vulnerability or weakness on the part of the offeree; 4) where the
vulnerability or weakness characteristically results in a significant
impairment of the rational-emotional capacity of the individual; 5) that
the offer actually has the effect of impairing the rational-emotional
capacity of the offeree; 6) such that, but for the impairment of this
capacity, the offeree would not have accepted the offer.' °
In other words, to be exploitative, an offer must create or take advantage
of a recognized psychological vulnerability which, in turn, interferes with
the offeree's capacity to reason. 5 As a result, commercial surrogacy
arrangements are not generally exploitative.1 6 At issue in these contracts are the third and fourth elements of exploitation: psychological
vulnerability resulting in the incapacity to reason effectively.'0 7
Vulnerability, as defined by Professor Hill, is "an internal psychological condition that typically or routinely causes an impairment in the
rational-emotive capacities of the actor." ' 8 In other words, the offeree's
capacity to reason is hampered by her personality or circumstance of
life. 9 Poverty, political oppression, or social alienation do not establish
this criterion unless they create an internal psychological disability."0
Consequently, for surrogates to be exploited, they must as a class
have a predisposition of personality or circumstance of life which impairs
their ability to reason effectively. However, there exists no compelling
evidence supporting inherent exploitation. Monetarily speaking, economic
incentive may create a psychological weakness resulting in rational

104. Hill, supra note 48, at 683-84.
105. To understand the basis for this conclusion, see id. at 661-83.

106. See id.
at 691-95.
107. See id. at 691. Assume for this discussion that the first and second elements (offer and the
requisite mental state) are satisfied. As for the fifth and sixth elements (actual cognitive impairment
and causation), they must be determined on an individual basis, so for the purpose of this discussion,

assume that they too are satisfied. See id.
108. Id. at 687.
109. Circumstances of life affecting the offeree's rational-emotive process include fear, grief,
guilt, severe depression, and psychological addiction. See id.
at 686.
110. See id. at 687.
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impairment only in the most extreme cases."' Yet, surrogacy contracts
generally involve only $10,000,"1 a sum of money that can hardly be
considered substantial when considering that it entails nine months or
forty weeks of service." '3 Thus, the economic incentive is not extreme
enough in nature to result in exploitation.
Similarly, Professor Hill argues that the claim of social conditioning
does not provide a basis for the allegation of exploitation."' The
decision to bear a child is made just as any ordinary decision. To argue
that it is the result of social conditioning would imply that all decisions
made by women are so influenced and similarly tainted. As Professor
Hill states, "[i]f no woman is demonstrably free in such matters, when
is any decision an expression of her true self?""' 5 To make such a
generalization is inappropriate. Furthermore, even assuming that the
decision to become a surrogate is the result of social conditioning, this
does not provide a basis for the assertion of exploitation because it is not
clear how it creates the requisite form of psychological vulnerability."6
Finally, assuming arguendo that social conditioning does provide a
psychological weakness, it could not possibly result in that form of
vulnerability which produces irrational decisions. The choice to become
a surrogate can be considered rational: just because some women would
never so choose does not make the decision to become one intrinsically
irrational." 7 Since the fourth condition (irrationality) is not met,
Professor Hill concludes that there can be no exploitation of the
8
surrogate."1
3. Comparison to Baby-Selling
Lastly, an extremely popular policy argument against the enforceability of commercial surrogacy contracts depicts commercial surrogacy
as the sale of a baby. Opponents of surrogacy contend that adoption
statutes prohibiting the exchange of money in connection with an
adoption should apply to commercial surrogacy contracts since such

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 693.
See id. at 691-92 & n.392 (noting that $10,000 is the most common surrogate fee).
This would amount to only $250 a week or $1.9 for each hour of the pregnancy.
See Hill, supra note 48, at 693.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 694.
See id. at 695.
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contracts ultimately result in the sale of a baby. 19 For example, the
court in Baby M reasoned that, unlike adoption statutes which value the
child's welfare, a surrogacy contract does not consider the child's best
interests:
It guarantees the separation of a child from its mother; it looks to
adoption regardless of suitability; it totally ignores the child; it takes the
child from the mother regardless of her wishes and her maternal fitness;
and it does20all of this, it accomplishes all of its goals, through the use
of money.1

Thus, like baby-selling, commercial surrogacy places a child in a home
without considering whether the prospective parents would be suitable to
raise the child. Instead, money is paid to the surrogate in exchange for
her parental rights, and thus, the couple has bought a baby.'
However, the following question seems to escape the minds of these
commentators: can a baby, or the parental rights to a child, be considered
a "good"? In general, "goods" are defined as the following:
"Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid ....
Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in
them can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are
"future" goods. A purported present sale of future goods or of any
interest therein operates as a contract to sell.'2

119. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241-42 (NJ. 1988). In referring to a law prohibiting
the payment or receipt of money in connection with the placement of a child for adoption, the New
Jersey Court stated:
The prohibition of our statute is strong. Violation constitutes a high misdemeanor,
a third-degree crime, carrying a penalty of three to five years imprisonment. The evils
inherent in baby-bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons. The child is sold
without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable parents. The natural mother
does not receive the benefit of counseling and guidance to assist her in making a decision
that may affect her for a lifetime. In fact, the monetary incentive to sell her child may,
depending on her financial circumstances, make her decision less voluntary. Furthermore,
the adoptive parents may not be fully informed of the natural parents' medical history.
Baby-selling potentially results in the exploitation of all parties involved. Conversely,
adoption statutes seek to further humanitarian goals, foremost among them the best
interests of the child.
Id. (citations omitted).

120. Id. at 1250. The court further argued that "[tihe contract's basic premise, that the natural
parents can decide in advance of birth which one is to have custody of the child, bears no
relationship to the settled law that the child's best interests shall determine custody." Id. at 1246.
121. See id. at 1248.
122. U.C.C. § 2-105(1)-(2) (1978).
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In a gestational surrogacy contract, there exists no baby and thus no
parental rights to one at the time of agreement. As a result, both the lack
of a child and parental rights to the child clearly cannot be considered an
existing good. With respect to future goods, one must have a right to the
future goods at the time of the contract in order to sell them. Since the
gestational surrogate never has parental rights to the child,"u she has
no interest in the baby at any time and thus cannot sell the baby or any
rights to the child as a future good. Hence, gestational surrogacy
contracts cannot be considered contracts for the sale of a "good."
Accordingly, the Johnson court determined that surrogacy contracts
did not involve the sale of a baby.'24 The court distinguished surrogacy
from adoption, remaining unpersuaded by the argument that surrogacy
will promote the view that children as well as surrogates are mere
commodities." The court reasoned that, unlike an adoption arrangement, when the surrogate entered into the contract, she did not have a
baby to sell and thus would not be "vulnerable to financial inducements
to part with her own expected offspring."'2 6 The court concluded that
the exchange of money in the gestational surrogacy contract was meant
to compensate the surrogate for her services rather than relinquish her
parental rights to the child. 27
Interestingly, Professor Epstein, who believes in the enforcement of
commercial surrogacy contracts, has argued not that they are contracts for
a service but that they are contracts for the relinquishment of parental
rights and obligations.' In other words, Professor Epstein argues that
the payment of money "only converts the transaction from a voluntary

123. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82 (Cal. 1993) (en bane).
124. See id. at 784 ("The parties voluntarily agreed to participate in in vitro fertilization and
related medical procedures before the child was conceived ...

125. See id. at 785.
126. Id. at 784. Interestingly, at least one court has applied similar reasoning to a traditional
surrogacy arrangement whereby the surrogate received compensation for her services:
[Tihe central fact in the surrogate parenting procedure is that the agreement to bear the

child is entered into before conception. The essential considerations for the surrogate
mother when she agrees to the surrogate parenting procedure are not avoiding the

consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or fear of the financial burden of child rearing.
On the contrary, the essential consideration is to assist a person or couple who

desperately want a child but are unable to conceive one in the customary manner to
achieve a biologically related offspring.
Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth exrel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky.

1986).
127. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784.
128. See Epstein, supra note 89, at 2328.
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donation of parental rights to a sale of parental rights."' 29 It does not
make the transaction involuntary; it does not make it corrupt. 3 ' There
exists no fraud, no concealment, and no misrepresentation simply from
the payment of money.'3 ' If anything, there exists a conflict of interest
between parent and child because the mother will weigh one interest
against another and ultimately sell the child to the highest bidder.'32
This conflict of interest, Professor Epstein argues, is not a reason to ban
the transaction; after all, "[s]tate-run adoption systems are rife with
conflicts of interest and incompetence, yet the response is not to ban their
operation entirely."' 33
Professor Epstein's argument is persuasive with respect to traditional
surrogacy contracts; however, it does not apply to those of a gestational
nature. Although he distinguishes between the two types of surrogacy
arrangements,' 34 his argument falters because it assumes that the birth
mother will have parental rights to sell. However, in Johnson, the
California court held that the surrogate who simply gestates the baby and
has no genetic link to the child obtains no parental rights to the baby.'35
Similarly, in Ohio, a court ordered that a birth certificate read the genetic
mother's name and not that of the birth mother.'36 Thus, unless the
surrogate has parental rights to the child, and in gestational surrogacy
arrangements she does not, Professor Epstein's argument is nugatory.
Consequently, its application must be limited to commercial surrogacy
contracts of a traditional arrangement.
As for gestational surrogacy contracts, they should be viewed as
personal services contracts as the California Supreme Court implied in
Johnson.'3 7 In general, a personal services contract is defined as a
contract which requires the promisor himself to perform.13 For exam-

129. Id. at 2333.
130. See id. But see In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988) (holding that the payment
of money to the surrogate makes her decision to give up the child involuntary). Professor Epstein
addresses the decision in Baby M and states that the court was incorrect in finding that the exchange
of money makes the transaction involuntary. See Epstein, supra note 89, at 2333.
131. See Epstein, supra note 89, at 2333.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 2307.
135. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782-84 (Cal. 1993) (en bane).
136. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767-68 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994). This friendly action
involved a married couple and the wife's sister who gestated the fetus to term. Both parties wanted
the birth certificate to list as the mother the sister who provided the ovum. See id. at 761-62.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
138. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.5, at 700-06 (2d ed. 1990).
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pie, a contract with an opera singer to perform a series of engagements
in Carnegie Hall depicts a personal services contract. The contract
requires that this particular person perform; no one would be an adequate
substitute.
Although gestational surrogacy arrangements do not precisely fall
within this definition of personal services contracts at first glance, they
ultimately require the surrogate herself to perform. Unlike the diva who
is hired for her voice, the gestational surrogate has no unique quality for
which she is hired. Rather, she develops a uniqueness unmatched by any
other woman when she is impregnated with the couple's zygote. From
that time forward until the birth of the child, she remains the only
woman who can perform the contract: she is the only woman bearing this
particular genetic child of the married couple with whom she contracted.
Thus, like the opera singer, the gestational surrogate provides a unique
service for those with whom she contracts.
Moreover, like other personal services contracts, performance of a
gestational surrogacy contract produces something of substance: a unique
child. Like an artist who paints the promisee's portrait, or a travel agent
who arranges a honeymoon for the promisees, or an architect who
designs the house of the promisee's dreams, the surrogate gives life to
the promisee's child. Performance is complete when the artist gives the
promisee her portrait, when the travel agent produces the airplane tickets,
when the architect delivers the house's blue prints, and when the
surrogate surrenders the child to the genetic parents. Thus, although each
of these situations results in something of substance, they all involve a
service. Moreover, since the subject matter in each situation is personal
in nature, the promisors cannot keep the finished products for themselves
without breaching their contracts. After all, the products are unique and
cannot be replaced with a substitute.'
Nevertheless, there remains one question: what must the surrogate
do for her performance to be considered a service? Of course, the simple
answer is that she must gestate the fetus to term and at birth, give the
baby to the promisees. However, her performance involves more than the
simple "renting of a womb."'"
Typically, like other personal services contracts, gestational
surrogacy contracts often include a substantial number of promises by the
promisor. The gestational surrogate usually promises to refrain from

139. See id. § 12.6, at 861-62.
140. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 742.
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behavior which might be harmful to the fetus. 4 ' She also promises to
regularly obtain prenatal care.' 42 As a result, to adequately perform her
service, she must abide by all of the contract's provisions and relinquish
all claims to the baby after its birth. It is at that point that her service is
complete.
DI.

ENFORCEABILITY OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS

Since there exist no persuasive policy arguments against gestational
surrogacy contracts, these contracts should be enforced and their
intentions respected unless there exists a problem in the bargaining
process. If such a problem were to arise, state contract law must be
applied to remedy the situation.
A.

The Agreement

The surrogacy contract must include in the written agreement all
terms in which the couple has any interest. Acceptance of the offer will
occur when the surrogate signs the document, thus making it a valid
personal services contract. To avoid many problems, the parties to the
contract must be selected with the utmost care, and the contract must
always be carefully drafted.
1. The Parties
The parties to gestational surrogacy contracts differ from those of
traditional surrogacy arrangements. In the latter situation, there exist only
three parties to the contract: the natural father, the surrogate, and the
surrogate's husband, if she is married. 43 The natural father's wife need
not be party to the agreement.'" However, with respect to a gestational
surrogacy arrangement, there exist four parties to the contract: the natural
father, the natural mother, the surrogate, and the surrogate's husband, if
she is married. The natural mother is included in the contract because she

141. This may include conduct such as smoking, drinking, or taking drugs. See Katie Marie
Brophy, A SurrogateMother Contractto Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263, 282-83 (1981-1982).
142. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 742 n.1 19; see also Epstein, supra note 89, at 2333
(arguing that the surrogate must obey all of the doctor's orders).
143. See Brophy, supra note 141, at 263-64, 268. The surrogate's husband must be included
in the contract if the state paternity statutes or state evidence codes give him parental rights. See
supra note 4.
144. For example, in Baby M, Mrs. Stem was not a party to the contract. See In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227, 1265-73 (NJ. 1988) (reprinting the entire surrogacy contract between the parties);
see also supra note 25 (discussing the contract in Baby M).
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has parental rights to her genetic child. 45
Nevertheless, there remains the problem of choosing the appropriate
woman to serve as the gestational surrogate. Since the genetic parents
have a personal interest in the surrogate's conduct and health, they must
choose her with a great amount of care.'" In fact, although the terms
of the agreement are important, the most important decision the infertile
couple must make is with whom the contract will be made. 47 Careful
selection of the surrogate "helps protect against diffuse concerns of
exploitation and advantage that could lead to fraud and other forms of
sharp practice"; 48 it ensures the child's safety from misbehavior; and
it allows for the enforcement of the contract:
That [form of] vested interest in the health and the welfare of the
surrogate mother in turn helps protect against the manifold forms of
contracting abuse. In the event that some abuse does take place, all the
standard legal remedies for fraud and misrepresentation are available
to the surrogate mother as a matter of course.'49
Thus, it is in the couple's best interest to find a woman who is trustworthy, who can fend for herself, and who will not be exploited by the
arrangement so that there exists no threat to the bargaining process or the
enforceability of the contract.
2. Voluntary Nature of the Transaction
Once the parties are chosen, they must always maintain the
voluntary nature of the transaction. 5 To do so, the contract must
benefit both sides of the transaction while having few negative effects on
third parties.
a. Mutual Gain
Economists insist that a contract result in a mutual gain for both
parties.' In particular, they argue that a contract should presume

145. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777-78 (Cal. 1993) (en bane). In Johnson, Crispina
Calvert was a party to the contract. See id. at 778; see also supra note 37 (noting the same).
146. See Epstein, supra note 89, at 2317.
147. See id.
148. Id.

149. Id. at 2317-18.
150. See supra notes 76-77, 129-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the voluntary
nature of the trausaction (or lack thereof) if compensation is involved.
151. See Epstein, supra note 89, at 2313.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss4/4

26

Lascarides: A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts
19971

GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS

mutual gain rather than mutual or one-sided exploitation."' This
presumption of mutual gain seems logical since parties generally enter
into a contract to benefit rather than harm themselves. Furthermore, it
reinforces the concept of consideration and the court's tradition of not
looking into its adequacy.'
Consideration consists of two components: a bargain and legal detriment.'54 There exists no requirement that the exchange be equivalent; 55 it merely must not be a sham.' 6 In gestational surrogacy
contracts, the bargain consists of one express condition and one bilateral
promise: (1) the gestational surrogate promises to return the baby to the
couple if the couple gives her its zygote; 57 and (2) the gestational
surrogate promises to gestate the couple's zygote if the couple promises
to raise the baby.'58 The $10,000 payment serves as the consideration
necessary to seal the deal,'59 its purpose being to compensate the
surrogate for her services in gestating the fetus to term. 6
Consequently, if no presumption of mutual gain exists, the only way
to make such a determination would be to require the courts to examine
the adequacy of the consideration: the court would have to closely
examine the terms of the exchange to determine whether each party
benefits from the transaction by gaining something they did not already
have. However, this determination contradicts the court's general practice
of not examining the adequacy of the consideration.' Hence, there
must exist a presumption of mutual gain in order to respect the court's
custom. To rebut it, one would only have to prove that the terms of the

152. See id.
153. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (stating that "the usual rule [is] that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned").
154. See JOHN D. CALAUARI & JOSEPH M. PERmLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs § 4-2, at 187-90
(3d ed. 1987). The authors state that "[t]he essence of consideration, then, is legal detriment, that has

been bargained for by the promisor and exchanged by the promisee in return for the promise of the
promisor." Id. § 4-2(c), at 189 (footnote omitted).

155. See id.§ 4-4, at 192.
156. See id. § 4-6, at 197-99.
157. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). The court determined
that the Calverts did not intend to donate a zygote to the surrogate. See id. Instead, the intention of
both parties was to give life to the Calverts' child. See id. The court further stated that "it is safe to

say that [the surrogate] would not have been given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child had
she, prior to implantation of the zygote, manifested her own intent to be the child's mother." Id.

158. See id. at 778.
159. See id. at 784. Strictly gratuitous promises are typically not enforced. See CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 154, § 4-1, at 185.
160. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 784.
161. See supra note 153.
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agreement violate existing laws or public policies, or that there exists a
defense to a valid contract; otherwise, the presumption of mutual gain
should stand.
b. Lack of Substantial Third Party Effects
Externalities, or third party effects, must also be examined in order
to maintain the voluntary nature of the transaction.'6 2 An externality
generally involves harmful or beneficial effects external to the contracting person(s):
[T]he concept includes external costs, external benefits, and pecuniary
as well as nonpecuniary externalities.... What converts a harmful or
beneficial effect into an externality is that the cost of bringing the effect
to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting persons is too
high to make it worthwhile.... 16 3
For example, returning to Romeo and Juliet,'" if they wanted to hire
a surrogate to gestate their baby, Romeo and Juliet might not consider
the positive and negative effects external to them: they might not
contemplate the long-term effects on the surrogate or her family, or the
potential negative effects on the child. Although there currently exists a
tendency toward considering only negative externalities,'65 that is, those
effects which are harmful to persons not party to the transaction,
economists argue that positive externalities must also be considered.'"
Thus, transactions should be presumed voluntary unless the negative
externalities outweigh the gains to the contracting parties. 67 With
respect to surrogacy arrangements, this means that a balancing test must
be performed to determine whether the gains to the couple and the
surrogate outweigh the potential negative effects on those not party to the
contract. 16

162. See Epstein, supra note 89, at 2315-16.
163. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS &

PRocEDUREs 347, 348 (1967).
164. See supra p. 1222.
165. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (NJ. 1988) (considering only the potential
negative long-term effects of the surrogacy arrangement).
166. See Epstein, supra note 89, at 2315.
167. Seek.
168. For a discussion of the factors which must be considered when balancing the effects of
surrogacy, see supra Part II.C.1.
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B. Application of ContractLaw
From the foregoing discussions, it seems all too clear that the only
negative aspect of commercial surrogacy contracts is their level of
uncertainty. From the transfer of the zygote to the delivery of the child,
the contracting couple is never fully assured that the surrogate will not
back out of the agreement for one reason or another. During these nine
months, there always exists the possibility that the surrogate might
change her mind and try to retain custody of the child whom the genetic
parents desperately want to raise. The couple's resulting anxiety is
justified.
However, in this respect, surrogacy arrangements are not unlike any
other contract: all enforceable contracts have an element of uncertainty.
There always exists the possibility that a party to a contract might
breach. To reduce most risks, contract law provides many remedies. For
surrogacy contracts, this means that instead of holding them unenforceable, courts should apply contract law when there exists the possibility
of breach of contract or inadequate bargaining process.
1. Potential Breach of Contract
Like all contracts, surrogacy arrangements inherently involve a
myriad of risks. Problems may arise due to the actions of the surrogate,
the couple, or God. The available remedy should depend upon who
caused the problem.
To solve the problems which may arise, courts must consider the
objective rather than subjective intent of the parties.'69 What matters is
not the secret intentions of the parties but rather what a reasonable
person in the position of the other party would believe the party
intended. 7 ' This approach limits the court's inquiry: it need only
consider whether there existed "a mutual manifestation of assent to the
same terms"'71 and not that there existed a "meeting of the minds"
between the parties." To make such a determination, the court examines the parties' words, whether written or oral, and actions.

169.
PERILLO,
170.
171.
172.
173.

In general, contract law values the objective intent of the parties. See CALAMARI &
supra note 154, § 2-2, at 26-27.
See id.
at 27.
Id. § 2-1, at 25.
See id.§ 2-2, at 26.
See id.
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a. Surrogate's Actions
The first set of problems which may arise are those caused by the
gestational surrogate when she refrains from performing her part of the
agreement. Two instances of nonperformance are of particular importance: (1) when the surrogate retains custody of the baby and (2) when
the surrogate seeks an abortion. Both involve the surrogate trying to
avoid the contract, and thus, her behavior should result in a material
breach.
i.

Custody Dispute

When faced with the custody dispute, courts must determine whether
a reasonable person would believe that the parties to the written
surrogacy contract agreed upon who would obtain custody of the
child. 74 Examination of the contract shows that custody remains in the
infertile couple: after all, the bargain includes both a bilateral promise on
this issue and an express condition, the latter requiring strict compliance. 75 Moreover, a reasonable person would believe that the couple
did not donate a zygote to the surrogate but, instead, hired her to gestate
it.'76 As a result, the surrogate's secret intention of keeping the child,
or her change of heart, is irrelevant.' Instead, contract law provides
that the surrogate must relinquish all claims to the baby, allowing
custody to remain with the infertile couple.'
Of course, opponents of surrogacy argue that the written contract
should be disregarded and that courts should instead turn to the law of
adoption.7 9 which looks to the child's best interests.' Typically, this
argument centers on the reasoning that if courts were to enforce the
surrogacy contract as the parties had agreed, this decision would

174. Assume for the purpose of this discussion that the gestational surrogate obtains parental
rights to the nongenetic child.
175. See CALAMARi & PERiLLO, supra note 154, § 11-9, at 445.

176. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
177. See Schuck, supra note 68, at 1799. Professor Schuck concludes that "[t]he risk of
subsequent regret is the price we pay for our commitment to personal autonomy and responsibility
in the face of uncertainty." Id.
178. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
179. See Brinig, supra note 88, at 2379.
180. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246 (N.J. 1988) (holding that the best interests of the
child shall determine custody); see also Johnson, 851 P.2d at 799-801 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(arguing for the use of the best interests test when establishing legal parenthood).
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ultimately result in the contractual placement of children before they are
born without investigation of the prospective parents. 8 ' Hence, these
opponents conclude that courts must examine the best interests of the
child when determining the custody dispute.
Although this concern is quite valid, awarding custody as per the
gestational surrogacy agreement does not necessarily operate contrary to
the child's best interests. Typically, courts applying the best interests of
the child standard to a surrogacy contract consider both (1) the child's
future and (2) the parties' physical, mental, and emotional health,
personal integrity, and ability to provide for the child. 8' Yet, these
courts fail to acknowledge that the surrogacy agreement itself takes into
consideration this two-part balancing test; after all, how many people
enter into a surrogacy contract with the intent to hurt or neglect the
child? Rather, these couples would likely become responsible, loving
parents:
The people who have struggled so hard to conceive their own child are
probably the best candidates to be good parents and not the worst. It
hardly seems likely that a couple that endured so much grief to have its
own child would embark on a course of abuse and neglect with a
surrogate child.... [T]he first obligation of a parent is unconditional
love of a child. Would that all parents showed that to their own
children. But is there any reason to think that parents by surrogacy
would not love the children whom they obtain by this arrangement? 1 3
Although risks do exist," 4 they are not extreme enough in nature to ban
surrogacy or even to overlook the agreement." 5 Courts should enforce
181. See Brinig, supra note 88, at 2379.
182. See Willing v. Willing, 655 So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995); Johnson v. Sparks,
437 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983); In re Petition of R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 486 (Colo.
1985) (en bane); In re Petition of G.D., 775 P.2d 90, 92 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Montgomery v.
Roudez, 509 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Il1.App. Ct. 1987); Hunsberger v. Hunsberger, 653 N.E.2d 118, 121
(Ind.Ct. App. 1995); Stine v. Stine, 479 So. 2d 681, 682 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Ireland v. Smith, 547
N.W.2d 686, 688 n.1 (Mich. 1996); King v. King, 793 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
Schuermann v. Schuermann, 607 P.2d 619, 621 (N.M. 1980); In re Whitaker, 522 N.E.2d 563, 56768 (Ohio 1988).
183. Epstein, supra note 89, at 2320-21 (footnotes omitted).
184. See Tamar Lewin, Man Accused of Killing Son Borne by a SurrogateMother, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 1995, at A16 (unmarried man who had entered into surrogacy contract accused of killing
child after obtaining custody).
185. Children conceived in the typical means run a far greater risk of abuse and neglect than
do children of surrogacy. See Epstein, supranote 89, at 2321 & n.26. Children born in stable homes,
those born of troubled marriages, and illegitimate children are all at risk of potential abuse, such risk
increasing in each scenario. See id. Thus, to ban the practice hardly seems to be the appropriate
response: "In these cases, we do not think that the risk of harm to children constitutes a powerful
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the agreement and assign custody as the parties intended since the parties
themselves ultimately have the child's best interests at heart.'86
Ironically, by giving custody to the contracting couple, the court
would be specifically enforcing the contract, an equitable remedy
frequently not available to personal services contracts. 7 because it
normally requires constant judicial supervision. However, with respect to
this custody issue, all that would be required is that the surrogate
surrender the baby to the couple; specific performance would not result
in the continuance of undesirable personal relations between the surrogate
and the couple. Thus, it should be available as a remedy in this instance
of breach.
ii.

Abortion Sought by the Surrogate

Unquestionably, abortion by the surrogate would result in a breach
of the surrogacy contract to which she is a party. Although the surrogate
has the right to obtain one,"' to do so would contravene the terms of
the contract. The court would have to choose between specifically
enforcing the contract before the abortion is performed or granting
monetary damages.
Since gestational surrogacy arrangements should be viewed as
personal services contracts, 9 specific performance will be generally
unavailable.' In all likelihood, the court would not stop the surrogate
from obtaining an abortion. If the surrogate were to abort the fetus, this
behavior should result in a material breach of the surrogacy contract, 9 '
thus discharging the couple's duty to pay the promised fee."9 In such

reason to license, limit, or ban procreation: it seems hard to believe that these concerns rise to this
level in a surrogacy context" Id. at 2321.
186. Further, one may argue that the best interests of the child standard used in adoption cases
should not apply to gestational surrogapy contracts since the surrogate has no parental rights to be

terminated. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). In fact, the Johnson
court expressly stated, "[g]estational surrogacy differs in crucial respects from adoption and so is not
subject to the adoption statutes." Id. Unlike the birth mother in the adoption scenario, the gestational

surrogate at no time obtains any parental rights to the child. See id. Rather, the genetic parents are
always the legal parents of the child, and as a result, no adoption takes place. See id. Hence, there
is no need for the best interests of the child standard.
187. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1981); Anita L. Allen, Privacy,
Surrogacy,and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759, 1768 (1988).

188. See supra note 73.
189. See supra Part II.C.3.
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1981).
191. See d.§ 241.

192. See id. § 242.
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a situation, a court would be inclined to award the couple legal
damages 93 to restore its reliance interest rather than its expectation or
restitution interest.
Expectation damages are awarded to put the injured party in as good
a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed as
promised.'94 They are not based upon what he had hoped at the time
of the contract but what he would have received.'95 In the gestational
surrogacy arrangement, the injured couple would have received a baby
had the surrogate performed as agreed. Yet, how does one place a
monetary value on life?
Restitution damages include only those expenditures that have
conferred some benefit on the other party.' In other words, the injured
party should be restored the benefit he has conferred on the other
party.97 Clearly in the surrogacy situation, the court cannot award this
type of damages to the contracting couple; after all, the only possible
benefit that the couple had conferred to the surrogate is the now aborted
fetus. Consequently, only the payments to her would fall into this
category, but they can be returned to the couple through the award of
reliance damages.
Thus, the court should award reliance damages to put the injured
party in the position he would have been in had the contract not been
made.'98 These damages can easily be calculated in the gestational
surrogacy arrangement: any compensation paid to the surrogate must be
returned to the couple. Additionally, the surrogate must reimburse the
couple for all fees and expenses incurred as a result of the agreement.
b. Couple's Actions
Another type of problem may occur due to the fault of the couple.
Typically included in surrogacy contracts is an abortion clause which
gives the couple the right to order an abortion.' However, if the
couple exercises such a right, it should be considered a material breach

193. See id. § 243.
194. See CALAARI & PERILLO, supra note 154, § 14-4, at 591-92.
195. See id. at 592.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1268 (NJ. 1988) (reprinting the clause of the
original contract between the parties which gives the genetic father the right to order an abortion).
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of contract, °° thus discharging the surrogate's duty to perform.2"'
Since she was willing to carry the fetus to term and was performing in
good faith," it seems only fair that the surrogate should be awarded
expectation damages: she should receive full payment as though the
contract had been performed as promised.0 3
c. "Acts of God"
Problems often arise due to an act of God, such as instances of
miscarriage, still birth, or the delivery of twins. Each of these instances
adversely affects the terms of the contract: the surrogate does not gestate
a single fetus to term as promised. Thus, the unhappy party" may seek
to excuse its performance, arguing that there has been a breach by the
other party. However, since there has been no material breach by either
party in any of these instances, performance should not be excused.
As long as the surrogate performs all of her promises in good faith,
she has not breached the contract.2 5 In the instance of nonperformance,
if the surrogate's behavior comports with good faith and fair dealing, her
failure to render performance may not be considered material.0 6
Keeping this duty in mind, in the instance of natural miscarriage, so long
as the surrogate is performing in good faith, the spontaneous miscarriage
should not function as a material breach which would discharge the
couple's duty to pay her for services rendered. Instead, under these
circumstances, it seems only fair that the court require the contracting
couple to pay the surrogate for services performed.
Further, the fact that the gestational surrogacy contract is a contract
for a service20 7 also supports the finding that there has been no material
breach by the surrogate in any of these instances. As a contract for a
service, performance requires the promisor herself to perform,0 8 and in

200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).
201. See id. § 242.

202. See id. § 205.
203. See id. § 236.

204. The unhappy party differs in each of these scenarios. In terms of miscarriage and still birth,
the married couple will seek to excuse its performance, arguing that the surrogate materially

breached the contract. In terms of twins, the surrogate will be the party disadvantaged: she contracted
to gestate the couple's one fetus, not two.

205. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
206. See id. § 241.
207. See supra Part II.C.3.
208. See FARNswoRTH, supra note 138, § 9.5, at 701-06.
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each of these natural occurrences, the surrogate adequately has done so.
Under the terms of the surrogate contract, the surrogate provides the
service of gestation through pregnancy, refrains from any behavior that
might harm the fetus, and regularly obtains prenatal care.2" In the
situation of a still birth, since the surrogate gestated the fetus to term, she
has performed her end of the bargain. As long as she performed in good
faith,21 she should still be paid the full contractual amount.
Accordingly, in the twin scenario, the surrogate performs the
promised gestative function and should receive payment for her services.
The only difference between her performance and that for which the
couple bargained is that the surrogate gestates two babies instead of only
one. However, since the contract's purpose was for her to endure one
pregnancy, the fact that she carries two fetuses should not have any
affect on the exchange. Payments are to compensate the surrogate for her
services of gestation through one pregnancy. As a result, she should
receive the same amount of money no matter how many babies she
gestates.
2. Inadequate Bargaining Process
Like all other contracts, surrogacy arrangements should be
scrutinized for abuses in the bargaining process. This includes examination into the defenses of fraud, lack of capacity, undue influence, duress,
and unconscionability. If the court were to find that any one of these
defenses exists, the contract becomes voidable by the party so in21
jured. 1
Of these defenses to a valid contract, opponents of surrogacy
generally choose to argue that surrogacy contracts are unconscionable
and therefore unenforceable.2 2 Contract law provides that if a court
finds an agreement, or a provision of an agreement, unconscionable at
the time the agreement was made, the court may refuse to enforce the
entire agreement, or the provision thereof, in order to avoid an
unconscionable result.2 3 In general, when making such a determination,
courts focus on two components of unconscionability: procedural

209. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
210. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).

211. See id. §§ 152-153, 164, 175, 177.
212. "[A]s a matter of common law ... unconscionable contracts are not enforceable.... [T]he
notion that an unconscionable bargain should not be given full enforcement is by no means novel."
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (footnote omitted).
213. See RESTATE mNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1997

35

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 25:1221

unconscionability and substantive unconscionability. 4 Procedural
unconscionability focuses on the procedure of the agreement and whether
there existed an absence of a meaningful choice."' Courts consider
such factors as gross inequality of bargaining power, inability to read the
provisions of the contract, age, intelligence, education, fraud, unfair
surprise, and sharp practices.216 Substantive unconscionability focuses
on the fairness of the exchange and whether there exists oppressive terms
that are unreasonably favorable to one party."7 Only upon a finding of
both procedural and substantive unconscionability may the court refuse
to enforce the agreement."'
214. See, e.g., Golden v. Mobil Oil Corp,, 882 F.2d 490, 493 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing
procedural and substantive unconscionability); Jones Distrib. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 943 F.
Supp. 1445, 1460 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same); Olsen v. Breeze, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 824 (Ct.
App. 1996) (same); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357,360-64 (Utah 1996) (same); Kohler Co. v. Wixen,
555 N.W.2d 640, 645-46 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (same); see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability
and the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967). Although the
U.C.C. does not apply if there exists no sale of goods, at least one commentator has argued that
U.C.C. § 2-302 will be followed by analogy in such cases. See UnconscionableSales Contractsand
the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-302, 45 VA. L. REV. 583, 590 (1959); see also WalkerThomas Furniture,350 F.2d at 449 (looking to the U.C.C. for guidance).
215. See Walker-Thomas Furniture,350 F.2d at 449; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 154,
§ 9-40, at 406-09.
216. See Walker-Thomas Furniture,350 F.2d at 449; Jones Distrib., 943 F. Supp. at 1460;
Maxwell v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 57-58 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc); Kohler, 555
N.W.2d at 645; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 154, § 9-40, at 406-09.
217. See Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 58; Olsen, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824; Kohler, 555 N.W.2d at 646;
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 154, § 9-40, at 407. Courts may look into the adequacy of the
exchange when faced with the possibility of substantive unconscionability:
[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a
commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly
likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given
to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to
be questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of
the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.
Walker-Thomas Furniture,350 F.2d at 449-50 (footnote omitted).
218. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 154, § 9-40, at 406. Courts are split on whether
both components need to be present. Many require a showing of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability. See, e.g., Golden, 882 F.2d at 493 (stating that "[b]oth procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability must exist before the provision is unenforceable"); Jones
Distrib., 943 F. Supp. at 1460 (stating that both procedural and substantive unconscionability are
required); Olsen, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824 (requiring both procedural and substantive elements of
unconscionability); Kohler, 555 NV.2d at 645 ("A clause is deemed unconscionable when there is
both a quantum of procedural and a quantum of substantive unconscionability."). However, other
courts may find a contract unconscionable if only one element of unconscionability is present. See,
e.g., Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah
1985) (recognizing both procedural and substantive unconscionability but finding that "[g]ross
disparity in terms, absent evidence of procedural unconscionability, can support a finding of
unconscionability'). For a discussion of the history of unconscionability and the division of
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Consequently, opponents of surrogacy argue that surrogacy contracts
satisfy the two components of unconscionability.219 Procedurally
speaking, opponents argue that surrogacy agreements generally function
to the benefit of the prospective parents and the infertility clinic at the
expense of the surrogate." It is not unusual for infertility clinics to
require surrogates to agree to many terms included in the contract,
claiming that the provisions are meaningless when, in fact, they are
not."2 For example, included in some surrogacy contracts is a "hold
harmless" clause.' Although clinics tell surrogates that this clause is
meaningless, it ultimately releases the clinics from liability.' If typical
surrogacy agreements are the result of such unequal bargaining,
opponents argue that they are procedurally unconscionable. 4
In addition, opponents of surrogacy argue that the specific terms of
the agreement are unfair to surrogates, thus satisfying substantive
unconscionability.' For example, surrogates are required to use the
medical and counseling services chosen by the infertility clinic. 6
Further, although surrogacy agreements may not stipulate that they may
be subjected to major surgery, surrogates must follow the advice of the
attending physician, even if it means undergoing a Caesarean section or
other medical procedure. 7 Since such oppressive terms, unfair to the
surrogate, satisfy substantive unconscionability, opponents of surrogacy
argue that if such terms are included in typical surrogacy agreements,
courts must find them unconscionable and refuse to enforce either the
unconscionable terms or the entire contract." 8
However, opponents of surrogacy contracts fail to realize that
unconscionability must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 9 All

procedural and substantive unconscionability, see Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 57-58.
219. See Coleman, supra note 11, at 512-13.
220. See id.
221. See id.at 513 (citing Susan Ince, Inside the Surrogacy Industry, in FAMILY MATrERS:
READINGS ON FAMILY LIVES AND THE LAW 104, 109 (Martha Minow ed. 1993)).
222. See id. (citing Ince, supra note 221, at 109).
223. See id. (citing Ince, supra note 221, at 109).
224. See id.
at 513-14.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 513 (citing Ince, supra note 221, at 108).
227. See id. (citing Ince, supra note 221, at 109).
228. See id. at 511-14.
229. See, e.g., John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1573 (D. Kan. 1986)
(stating that "each 'unconscionability' case must rest upon its own facts'); see also CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 154, § 9-39, at 404 (stating that "[mI]any cases have held that the provision
mandates an evidentiary hearing or a full fledged trial on the merits").
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cases do not include the same terms or the same facts surrounding those

terms. As such, courts must review the terms and the facts surrounding
the contract and bargaining process in order to determine whether there
exists procedural and substantive unconscionability. If such is the case

after adequate examination,"

then clearly the court may refuse to

enforce the agreement or the terms in question.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Only one percent of surrogates change their minds and seek custody

of the child."' That statistic may explain the few court decisions on
surrogacy contracts. In fact, there exist far more law review articles

discussing this topic than court decisions. 2
Nevertheless, many state courts and legislatures mistakenly make all
commercial surrogacy arrangements, including those of a gestational
nature, unenforceable

or

even criminal.

3

Yet, this

sweeping

230. The party seeking to use unconscionability as a defense bears the burden of proof. See Pig
Improvement Co. v. Middle States Holding Co., 943 F. Supp. 392, 402 (D. Del. 1996); American
Stone Diamond, Inc. v. Lloyds of London, 934 F. Supp. 839, 844 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Hoffmann v.
Boone, 708 F. Supp. 78, 82-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Indem.
Co., 468 S.E.2d 570, 573 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). "'The burden should be on the party submitting [a
standard contract] in printed form to show that the other party had knowledge of any unusual or
unconscionable terms contained therein."' A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
124 (Ct. App. 1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144,
147 (Ind. 1971)).
231. See Lori B. Andrews, SurrogateMotherhood: The ChallengeforFeminists, in SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 167, 171 (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
232. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 898 n.13 (Ct. App. 1994) (noting
the abundance of law review articles and the scarcity of court decisions).
233. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (West 1991) (holding all surrogacy contracts void
and unenforceable); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-402 (Supp. 1996) (imposing a civil penalty, or one year
imprisonment, or both, for entering into, assisting, or inducing another to enter into a surrogacy contract); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (West Supp. 1996) (holding all surrogacy contracts void and
unenforceable); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.990 (Michie 1995) (class D felony); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2713(A) (West 1991) (holding all surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (holding all surrogacy contracts void and
unenforceable); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.857(2), .859 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996) (deeming
it a felony to enter into surrogacy contracts with a minor or a mentally infirm woman or to procure
surrogacy agreements for compensation); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200(1) (Supp. 1996); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 123 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (imposing a civil penalty upon those entering into a
surrogacy agreement and a felony for third parties who recruit or procure women to become surrogates); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (1991 & Supp. 1995) (holding all surrogacy contracts void and
unenforceable); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(46)(A) (1996) (holding all surrogacy contracts void
and unenforceable); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(1)(d) (1995) (Class B misdemeanor); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26.250 (West Supp. 1997) (gross misdemeanor); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227,
1240-50 (NJ. 1988) (holding all surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable); Doe v. Kelley, 307
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unenforceability not only causes problems for the parties to the contract,
but it generates problems for the courts which have the misfortune of
determining the custody issue.
Gestational surrogacy contracts, even if commercial, should be
viewed as personal services contracts, free from all purported public
policy arguments, and completely enforced, so that infertile couples like
Romeo and Juliet? 4 may enjoy the miracle of birth and the joy of
family life. Out of desperation, some will still choose to enter into such
an arrangement, even if the contract is unenforceable, illegal, or both. If
honored by the parties, they will go unpunished. If challenged, the court
will determine the custody issue, award the appropriate remedy, if any
is needed, and possibly dole out punishment. Hence, unless current laws
are amended to reflect the difference between the types of surrogacy
contracts, Romeo and Juliet's plight remains disheartening:
A glooming peace this morning with it brings;
The sun, for sorrow, will not show his head:
Go hence, to have more talk of these sad things;
Some shall be pardon'd, and some punished;
For never was a story of more woe,
Than this of Juliet and her Romeo.2 5
Denise E. Lascarides*

N.W.2d 438, 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the surrogacy contract was prohibited because
it would violate a statute banning the exchange of money in connection with an adoption).
234. See supra p. 1222.
235. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 5, sc. 3.
* The Author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Mark L. Movsesian for his expert
guidance, and to all the members of her family for their unending encouragement and support. The
Author dedicates this Note to the memory of her father, Dr. Emanuel Lascarides, whose contribution
to the medical profession and sincere devotion to others will always be remembered.
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